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Compensation for Motor Vehicle Injuries 
in New Zealand 
John Michael MILLER* 
Compensation for Motor Vehicle injuries in New Zealand is included 
as part of the overall no fault accident compensation scheme in the Acci-
dent Rehabilitation and Compensation Insurance Act 1992. This Act re-
placed the Accident Compensation Act 1982 and abolished lump sum 
compensation for injuries and excluded mental trauma injury claims which 
were available under the previous Act. 
This led to considerable public dissatisfaction with the 1992 Act and 
brought lawyers back into the compensation process with damages claims 
for mental trauma injuries. The renewed interest of lawyers in litigation 
also led to an increase in exemplary/punitive damages claims. 
Despite this return to litigation the motor vehicle part of the no fault 
scheme presents few problems. It is well funded and is well accepted apart 
from the recurrent question of compensating drunken drivers for their 
injuries. 
En Nouvelle-Zélande, l'indemnisation des victimes d'accidents d'au-
tomobile n'est qu'une des composantes du régime général d'assurance 
sans égard à la responsabilité, prévu par la Accident Rehabilitation and 
Compensation Insurance Act de 1992. Cette loi remplace la Accident Com-
pensation Act de 1982 en abolissant des droits auparavant reconnus aux 
victimes : indemnisation du préjudice moral sous forme de paiement forfai-
taire et exclusion des réclamations pour les conséquences d'un trauma-
tisme psychique. 
* Barrister and Senior Lecturer in law, Victoria University of Wellington. 
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La loi de 1992 s'est avérée largement impopulaire et a ramené les 
avocass dans le processus d'indemnisation pour les blessures de nature 
psychique. Ce retour enforce des avocats a aussi entraîné une augmenta-
tion des réclamations pour dommagss exemplaires ou punitifs. 
Malgré cela, l'indemnisation des victimes d'accidents d'automobile 
pose peu de problèmes. Le financement du régime est adéquat et il est bien 
accepéé par la population, si ce n 'est de la remise en question des indem-
nités versées aux conducteurs ivres. 
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New Zealand (NZ) does not have a separate no fault scheme for injuries 
from motor vehicle accidents. All accident victims whether they are injured 
on the road, at home, in a hospital, at play or at work are covered by the one 
Act—the Accident Rehabilitation and Compensation Insurance Act, 
19921. A person injured in a motor vehicle accident is therefore compen-
sated in the same way as these other accident victims2. 
1. Personal Injury and Cover 
To come under the Act the injured person has to show : 
a) A personal injury3 
and 
b) Cover4 under the Act. 
If a injured person has cover under the Act then there can be no resort 
to the New Zealand Courts for damages for the injury as section 14 of the 
Act bars «proceedings for damages arising directly or indirectly out of 
personal injury covered by this Act5 ». 
Because motor vehicle accidents generally involve some form of force-
ful contact there is no problem with the vast majority of motor accident 
victims coming under the definition of : 
a) personal injury — as they invariably suffer physical injuries6 
and 
b) cover—as their personal injuries are caused by an accident7. 
Unlike other overseas motor vehicle schemes there is no need for the 
injured person to show that the injury happened through the use of a motor 
1. Which came into force on 1 July 1992 (hereinafter referred to as «the Act»). For the 
background to this Act and cases thereunder see : J. MILLER and D. RENNIE, Brooker's 
Accident Compensation in New Zealand Wellington, vol. 1 and 2, New Zealand, 1992. 
2. A person injured at work does receive compensation for the first week whereas com-
pensation for non work injuries start after the first week sections 38 and 39 of the Act. 
3. Sections 4 and 8 of the Act. See infra, note 16 for the statutory definitions. 
4. Section 8 of the Act. See infra, note 17 for the definition of cover. 
5. This does not bar claims for compensatory damages for mental trauma (see infra, note 
12) or claims for exemplary/punitive damages (see infra, note 37). Nor does it prevent 
actions being brought in Courts outside of New Zealand. Indeed the ACC may assist 
with such overseas litigation : section 15 of the Act. 
6. Sections 4 and 8 of the Act. See infra, note 17 for the statutory definitions. 
7. Section 3 defines accident as : a) A specific event or series of events that involves the 
application of a force or resistance external to the human body and that results in physical 
injury [...]. This clearly covers most motor vehicle injuries. 
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vehicle. An injured person simply comes under the general accident com-
pensation scheme if they have a personal injury that has cover. 
The New Zealand legislation therefore does not have the demarcation 
disputes that concern other stand alone motor vehicle schemes8. 
2. Upsurge in Damages Claims and Reasons for That 
Although obtaining compensation from the Accident Compensation 
Corporation9 for motor vehicle injuries poses little difficulty10 and the bar 
on damages claims remains, there has been a spectacular upsurge in dam-
ages claims being filed for mental trauma and exemplary damages in per-
sonal injury cases. They have mainly been for sexual abuse, medical negli-
gence and work related injuries although there have been some as a result 
of motor vehicle accidents' '. 
8. However the cause of the injury is of some importance in funding the scheme and in 
work injury claims. See infra, note 60. 
9. Hereinafter referred to as the ACC. 
10. Apart from any general compensation problems faced by all claimants. In 1997 the 
median time from registration of a claim to the payment of first week compensation was 
30 days : 1997 ACC Annual Report, p. 54. 
11. Examples of some of the cases filed are : 
F. v. Northland Health Ltd. (District Court, Whangarei, NP 868/93, 1993): $150,000 
exemplary damages sought by an employee for exposure to chemicals at the hospital ; 
M. v. Wellington Area Health Board (High Court, Wellington, CP 205/93, Gallen J., 
6 December 1994): $250,000 exemplary damages sought against two doctors and the 
Hospital over the death of the plaintiffs wife. A further $75,000 is being claimed for 
mental trauma ; 
Akavi v. Taylor Preston (High Court, Wellington, CP 93/94, Master Thomson, 13 Sep-
tember 1994) : $150,000 exemplary damages sought by employee after being scalped by 
machinery at work. Settled on confidential terms ; 
W. v. Health South Canterbury (High Court, Timaru, CP 2/95, 1995) : $1,500,000 com-
pensatory damages sought for mental trauma from the switching of new born babies by 
a hospital. Settled on confidential terms ; 
W. v. Counties Manukau Health Ltd (High Court, Auckland, CP 583/94, Barker J., 
13 April 1995) : $200,000 exemplary damages sought against the Hospital for sexual abuse 
of two children by a paedophile inadequately supervised on release from a Mental 
Hospital ; 
Boe v. Hammond (High Court, Wellington, M 3/95, Master Thomson, 26 May 1995): 
$250,000 compensatory damages for mental trauma and $75,000 exemplary damages 
from the death of a spouse in a motor vehicle accident ; 
B. v. Counties Manukau Health Ltd. (High Court, Auckland, 1995) : $75,000 exemplary 
damages sought against a doctor and the Hospital over the birth of a brain damaged 
child. A further $250,000 is being claimed for mental trauma ; 
R. v. Liddell and Auckland Area Health Board (High Court, Auckland, 1995) : $250,000 
exemplary damages sought for sexual abuse of two children by Liddell, a social worker 
employed by the Hospital ; 
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There are three main reasons for this upsurge in damages claims. They 
are: 
1) Mental trauma is now excluded from the definition of personal injury 
under the Act. This means that damages for mental trauma can now be 
claimed in Court. 
2) Exemplary damages claims are now allowed in cases of negligent as 
well as intentional conduct. 
3) The abolition of lump sum compensation by the Act. 
2.1 Mental Trauma Claims 
Under the previous Accident Compensation Act 1982 the definition of 
personal injury by accident included «the physical and mental conse-
quences of any such injury or of the accident12 ». Suffering mental conse-
quences from an accident (an unlooked for mishap or untoward event '3) was 
therefore sufficient to come under the Act. Such mental consequences 
ranged from transient emotional trauma such as humiliation through to 
unresolved grief reactions and serious psychiatric injury. 
Thus in ACC v. £14, an employee who had a nervous breakdown as a 
result of being sent on a stressful management course was held to have 
M. v. Counties Manukau Health Ltd. (High Court, Auckland, 1996) : $75,000 exemplary 
damages sought against a doctor and the Hospital over the death of a baby. A further 
$250,000 is being claimed for mental trauma ; 
Innes w.AG (High Court, Auckland, CP 152/95, Elias J., lOJuly 1997): claim for damages 
by the estate of Matthew Innes for his death whilst being taken to Hospital in a police 
car; 
B. v. Residual Health Unit (High Court, Timaru, 1997) : $1 million dollars compensatory 
damages claimed by parents for mental trauma and $400,000 exemplary damages for 
brain damage caused to an infant in hospital ; 
W. .. Health Waikato Ltd. (District Court, Te Kuitit CP P8/97, 1197) : :100,000 0ompen-
satory damages for mental trauma suffered by a family for the loss of the deceased's 
amputated legs ; 
McGrory v. Ansett NZLtd. (High Court, Auckland, CP 228/97, Smellie J., 11 December 
1997) : claim by passengers for unspecified exemplary and compensatory damages from 
an air crash ; 
Jackson v. Burcher & Ors (High Court, Hamilton, CP 56/94, Master Faire, 19 September 
1997): a claim for $1.5 million exemplary damages for medical negligence and alleged 
cover up of radioactive damage as the result of a scan. 
Some of these claims have been abandoned or settled ; the rest are still going through. 
In the spring of 1998, the Canadian dollar was quoted at 1,25 when compared to a 
NZ dollar. 
12. Section 2, Accident Compensation Act J982. 
13. Fentonv. Thorley, [1903] AC 403. 
14. [1992] 2 NZLR 426. 
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suffered personal injury by accident and in Cochrane v. ACC15, a mother 
who suffered mental trauma from watching her son die in hospital after he 
had been tortured by a gang was also held to have suffered personal injury 
by accident. However under the 1992 Act such claims are excluded from the 
scheme16. This is done through the definitions of personal injury and mental 
injury. 
2.1.1 Definitions 
The definition of personal injury is contained in section 4 and sec-
tion 8 (3) of the Act and unlike the previous definition of personal injury by 
accident in the 1982 Act is a closed definition : 
S4 Definition of Personal Injury — (1) For the purposes of this Act 'personal 
injury' means the death of, or physical injuries to, a person, and any mental injury 
suffered by that person which is an outcome of those physical injuries to that 
person and has the extended meaning assigned to it by section 8 (3) of this Act [...] 
S8 Cover for personal injury occurring in New Zealand—(1) This Act shall apply 
in respect of personal injury occurring in New Zealand on or after the 1st day of 
July 1992 in respect of which there is cover under this Act. 
(2) Cover under this Act shall extend to personal injury which — 
(a) Is caused by an accident to the person concerned ; or 
(b) Is caused by gradual process, disease or infection arising out of and in the 
course of employment as defined in s. 7 or s. 11 of this Act ; or 
(c) Is medical misadventure as defined in section 5 of this Act ; or 
(d) Is a consequence of treatment for personal injury covered by this Act. 
(3) Cover under this Act shall also extend to personal injury that is mental or 
nervous shock suffered by a person as an outcome of any act of any other person 
performed on, with, or in relation to the first person (but not on, with or in relation 
to any other person), being— 
(a) An act that is within the description of any offence listed in the First schedule 
to this Act17 
15. [1994] NZAR 6. The writer appeared as counsel in this case. Although it was decided in 
1994 it was case under the 1982 Act. The case enabled a large group of the families of 
crime victims killed by violent acts including motor vehicle crashes to gain compensation 
for their mental trauma under the 1982 Act. Their cases had been adjourned pending the 
test case of Cochrane. 
16. Because of pressure from employers groups who did not want such claims to come 
within the ACC scheme as it would increase their ACC premiums. Ironically it has led 
to this increase in litigation and the need to take out insurance against such claims. 
17. The offences listed in the First Schedule are the usual range of sex crimes sexual, 
violation, indecent assault, etc. 
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2.1.2 Type Of Mental Trauma Included 
Therefore only mental trauma which is an outcome of physical injury 
is included in the Act18. Furthermore only very serious mental traumais in-
cluded for the phrase « mental injury » is defined in section 3 as « a clinically 
significant behavioural, psychological or cognitive dysfunction19 ». 
In ACC v. E20, a case decided under the 1982 Act, the Court of Appeal 
said: 
It would be a strange situation if cover under the Act for a person suffering serious 
mental consequences caused by an accident were to depend upon whether or not 
some physical injury however slight also is sustained. Further it would create major 
difficulties should it be necessary in particular cases to separate physical and 
mental injuries. 
This « strange situation » is now the law under the 1992 Act. 
2.1.3 Type Of Mental Trauma Excluded 
As recognised under the 1982 Act mental trauma can range from tran-
sient emotional reactions of embarrassment, anger, humiliation, etc., 
through to more serious mental trauma such as shock and on to serious 
psychiatric damage. 
The 1992 Act no longer recognises transient emotional trauma as a 
personal injury. This means that an injured person can sue for damages for 
transient emotional trauma. The Act does recognise mental or nervous 
shock as a personal injury but only as the result of a sex crime21. If there is 
no sex crime involved the injured person can sue for damages for this mental 
or nervous shock. The Act recognises mental injury as an outcome of 
physical injury as a personal injury but : 
1) if the mental injury is not an outcome of the physical injury and 
happened prior to the physical injury as in the terror at the approach of 
a train while stuck on a level crossing ; or 
2) if the mental injury happened at the same time as or after the injury but 
came from brooding over the horrific sights involved in the accident 
and not from the injuries then the mentally injured person can sue for 
damages. 
18. Apart from the mental trauma suffered as a result of an act which is a sex crime—section 
8 (3). 
19. The phrase appears to be taken from the AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION'S, 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, DSM III, 3rd edition, p. 6. 
20. [1992] 2NZLR426,434. 
21. Section 8 (3). 
378 Les Cahiers de Droit (1998) 39 C. de D. .37 
Hence the upsurge in damages claims for mental trauma using the torts 
of assault, battery and negligence22. 
2.1.4 Assault, Battery and Negligence 
Damages claims for assault and some batteries also became possible 
after the 1992 Act because mental trauma is not included in the Act and 
physical injury is not defined in the Act. Given the separate definition of 
« mental injury », the phrase « physical injury » cannot include any aspect 
of mental trauma. The legislation would not specify a restrictive definition 
of mental injury if lesser mental trauma could simply be included under 
physical injuries. It is also submitted that physical injuries must mean more 
than mere physical contact. The Crimes Act 1961 defines «to injure» as 
meaning « to cause actual bodily harm23 ». 
In R v. McArthur24, this definition was referred to and Mahon J held 
that it was not an injury where the victim was only shaken and dazed after 
being knocked down by a car. An injury had to be something in the way of 
broken bones, bruising, cuts or lacerations. 
It could be argued that there should be different interpretations given 
to injury in a criminal statute and that given in a compensation statute 
because of the different policy objectives. However, given the restricted 
nature of the definition in section 4 physical injuries have to be something 
more than mere hurt and be in the nature of cuts, wounds, bruises and 
fractures. Thus, any contact which did not result in these types of injuries 
would not be a physical injury. This has been confirmed in Bell v. ARCIC25, 
an Accident Compensation case in the District Court26 where a cotton bud 
lodged in a ear was held not to be a personal injury even though medical 
attention was required to remove it. 
22. NZ Law Schools suddenly had to start teaching nervous shock in Tort Law courses 
after neglecting it for nearly 20 years. The legal profession also had to be warned as they 
could be sued for negligent advice if they failed to advise injured clients of their possible 
damages claims—hence the Common Law Damages section in J. MILLER and D. REN-
NIE, Brooker's Accident Compensation in New Zealand 1992 Wellington, New Zealand, 
Vol. 1. 
23. Section 2 Crimes Act 1961. 
24. [1975] 1 NZLR 486. 
25. See J. MILLER and D. RENNIE, op. cit., note 22, para. AC4.04. 
26. The Review and Appeal structure is contained in sections 89-99 of the Act. In essence 
one applies for a review of an adverse ACC decision to a Review Officer, then there is 
a general appeal to the District Court exercising its Accident Compensation jurisdiction, 
followed by an appeal on a question of law to the High Court and eventually to the 
Court of Appeal. In 1997 there were 3,414 reviews and appeals heard and 34.6% were 
decided against the ACC : 1997 ACC Annual Report, p. 55. 
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Thus if there is physical contact which is not a physical injury e.g. a 
contemptuous touch this also could be the subject of a damages claim. If 
there was no damage suffered there would certainly be a problem in suing 
for negligence but a claim in assault and battery could be an option particu-
larly if there was a deliberate attempt to strike the victim27. 
2.1.5 No Clear Decision On Mental Trauma 
Despite the number of claims filed for damages for mental trauma we 
still await a decision from the Court of Appeal. Most of the claims have 
survived strike out applications and as yet only one mental trauma case 
Kingi v. Partridge2* has proceeded to an adverse judgment by a High Court 
Judge. 
In that case a claim for nervous shock by a family over the death of a 
relative in hospital was struck out on the basis of the tests for proximity laid 
down by the House of Lords in Alcock v. Chief Constable of South York-
shire^. 
However there are some doubts whether the English tests for nervous 
shock will be adopted in New Zealand by the Court of Appeal. Lord Cooke 
when he was President of the Court of Appeal noted30 that the Alcock 
27. In New Zealand it is still unclear whether an assault and battery can only be committed 
intentionally. In Dehn v. AG, [1988] 2 NZLR 564, 583, Tipping J. said that a battery 
required an intentional as opposed to an unintentional application of force. This point 
was not considered on appeal by the Court of Appeal, [1989] 1 NZLR 320. Although the 
Court of Appeal in McKenzie v. AG, [1992] 2 NZLR 14, said that claims for assault and 
battery were barred under the Accident Compensation legislation, this decision was 
under the old definition of « personal injury by accident » in the 1982 Act. The definition 
in the 1992 Act with its exclusion on mental trauma is significantly different and now 
allows these claims to be made. 
28. High Court, Rotorua, CP16/93, Thorp J., 2 August 1993. However in a recent decision 
issued after this article was written, Pankhurst J. disagreed with the decision of Thorp 
J. in Kingi. See Palmer v. Danes Shotover Rafts Ltd & Ors, High Court, Invercargill, 
CP10/97, Pankhurst J., 18 March 1998. 
29. [1992] 1 AC 410. 
30. In Mouat v. Clark Boyce, [ 1992] 2 NZLR 559,569. .n two recent deciisons which became 
available after this article was written a Master of the High Court has decided that the 
more liberal Australian approach to the requirement for proximity in nervous shock 
cases should be preferred to the more restrictive English approach. See Van Soest & 
Ors v. The Residual Health Unit & Ors, High Court, Christchurch, CP180/96, Master 
Venning, 22 December 1997 and Legge & Ors v. The Attorney General, High Court, 
Christchurch, M290/96, Master Venning, 19 December 1997. The more llberal Australian 
approach is shown in Andrews v. Williams, [1967] VR 831, Coates v. Government 
Assurance Office of NSW, (1995) 36 NSWLR 1 and Pham v. Lawson, (1997) 68 SASR 
124. However Master Venning considered that a recognised mental or psychiatric illness 
was still required for a nervous shock claim at common law. 
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decision was really a policy decision thus indicating that different tests for 
nervous shock may be more appropriate for New Zealand. 
2.1.6 Damages For Distress 
New Zealand certainly has an indigenous approach to many areas of 
Tort law31 and has shown a readiness to award damages for transient 
emotional trauma such as distress. In Mouat v. Clark Boyce32 the plaintiff 
was awarded damages for the financial loss and distress she suffered 
through the defendant firm of solicitors failing to properly advise her when 
she guaranteed financial transactions for her son. The defendant solicitors 
challenged the award of $25,000 to Mrs. Mouat for her distress. They argued 
that the worry, inconvenience and stress suffered by Mrs. Mouat were not 
causative of any physical consequences and did not amount to nervous 
shock or neurosis such as to be compensatable in tort. 
The Court of Appeal rejected this argument and upheld the award. 
Lord Cooke said : 
In my opinion, when the plaintiff has a cause of action for negligence, damages for 
distress, vexation, inconvenience and the like are recoverable in both tort and 
contract, at least if reasonably foreseeable consequences of the breach of duty. It 
has been said that mental distress is not by itself sufficient damage to ground an 
action : see McGregor on Damages (15th ed 1987) para 89. But that question does 
not arise here as the plaintiff has suffered other recoverable damage. 
While the fact that there was other recoverable damage (e.g. financial 
loss) meant that Lord Cooke did not have to decide whether mental distress 
alone was sufficient, Richardson J. considered that it was. He said : 
In the present case where there is a duty of care to the plaintiff, the scope of the 
damages recoverable is essentially a question of remoteness of damage which turns 
on whether the particular harm was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the 
particular breaches of duty which have been established. And public policy con-
cerns which emphasise the often temporary and relatively trivial nature of the harm 
and the risks of falsification cannot justify leaving the burden of the loss with the 
innocent victim where the claim is adequately proved. 
Gault J. also considered that there was no reason to interfere with the 
award of damages for stress. 
Thus it would appear that damages claims for mental trauma in negli-
gence or assault and battery will not fail solely on the grounds that there is 
only transient mental trauma. 
31. Brown v. Heathcote Council, [1986] 1 NZLR 76, 80. 
32. [1992] 2 NZLR 559. 
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2.1.7 Section 14 Bar On Damages 
The only remaining argument against such claims succeeding is where 
the emotional trauma arises from witnessing or learning about another 
person being injured or killed. 
It will be remembered that section 14 of the Act bars damages claims 
« arising directly or indirectly out of personal injury covered by this Act ». 
While it is clear that the person suffering from metal trauma has not suffered 
a personal injury covered by the Act the person whom he has seen injured 
or killed certainly has. The argument can then be made by a defendant that 
the damages claim for mental trauma arises directly or indirectly out of the 
other persons personal injury and is therefore barred by section 14. This 
argument succeeded recently before a Master of the High Court who struck 
out the plaintiff's claim. In that case Palmer v. Danes Shotover Rafts Ltd. 
& Ors33, the plaintiff's wife had been killed in a rafting accident. He had seen 
this and had suffered nervous shock. He had not suffered physical injuries 
so his mental trauma was not a personal injury and was not therefore 
covered by the Act. Nevertheless his claim for $50,000 exemplary damages 
against each defendant was struck out by the Master as being barred by 
section 14 of the Accident Rehabilitation and Compensation Insurance Act 
1992. 
The Master considered that although the Plaintiff had not suffered any 
personal injury his wife clearly had and his claim arose indirectly out of her 
personal injury. This case is being appealed but if it is upheld it will mean 
that a person such as the plaintiff who does not come under the Act and 
therefore receives no compensation also has no right to sue for damages. 
However it is unlikely to be upheld as it is contrary to many other High 
Court interlocutory decisions. 
For example, in McGrory v. Ansett NZ Ltd.34, leave was given for a 
claim to be added for compensatory damages for mental injury which was 
not the outcome of physical injury. This case involved a plane crash where 
clearly there were physical injuries to others. Indeed the claims for compen-
satory damages for physical injuries were struck out but the claim for 
33. High Court, Invercargill, CP 10/97, Master Venning, 3 December 1997. Since overruled 
on appeal in a decision issued after this article was written. See Palmer v. Danes Shotover 
Rafts Ltd. & Ors, High Court, Invercargill, CP10/97, Pankhurst J., 18 March 1998. 
Pankhurst J. said : « It is my view that the natural and ordinary meaning of s. 14(1) does 
not extend to the secondary victim of an accident ». The case is now going on appeal to 
the Court of Appeal. 
34. High Court, Auckland, CP 228/97, Smellie J., 11 December 1997. 
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exemplary damages was allowed to continue along with any mental injury 
damages. 
It will eventually be a policy decision for the Court of Appeal but it is 
submitted that although a literal reading of the words in section 14 could bar 
such claims the Court of Appeal would be slow to deny access to the courts 
for those excluded from the Act. The court would probably reason as they 
did for exemplary damages claims that the mental trauma arises not from 
the other persons personal injury or death but from the defendant's conduct 
in bringing about such a horrific event. Any other decision would also lead 
to the anomalous situation of some mental trauma claims being barred 
where the trauma arises from an injury to another but allowed when there 
has been no such fear or there has been such a fear but no injury eventuates 
as in the old case of Pugh v. London, Brighton and South Coast Railway 
Co?5, where a signalman suffered nervous shock when he thought a train 
was about to crash. It did not crash and there were no injuries. Pugh's case 
was approved by the New Zealand Court of Appeal in ACC v. E36. 
At common law, the essential requirement for a nervous shock claim, 
is that the defendant owed a duty of care to the plaintiff who suffered the 
nervous shock. That allegation depends on a number of features including 
proximity and relationship. The injuries suffered by the victim are only 
important in showing that the nervous shock claim is likely to be genuine. 
As in Pughss case it is not essential for anyone to have been injured. 
2.2 Exemplary/Punitive Damages Claims 
The 1972 and the 1982 Accident Compensation Acts contained an 
equivalent section to section 14 of the 1992 Act and barred proceedings for 
damages which arose directly or indirectly out of personal injury by acci-
dent. 
This statutory language was interpreted in some early cases as not only 
excluding proceedings for compensatory damages but also exemplary/puni-
tive damages. However, although acknowledging that the literal wording of 
the Act could be read this way, the Court of Appeal in a policy decision in 
Donselaar v. Donselaar*1 decided otherwise. It held that exemplary/puni-
tive damages did not arise out of the personal injury but arose from the 
conduct of the wrongdoer. They were not therefore barred by the Act. Thus 
from an early stage in the ACC scheme such damages claims could be made 
whether a person's physical or mental injuries came under the Act or not. 
35. [1896] 2 QB 248. 
36. [1992] 2 NZLR 426. 
37. [1982] 1 NZLR 97. 
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2.2.1 Negligent Conduct 
However until recently exemplary/punitive damages claims only arose 
in cases of intentional harm and were thus fairly limited as most defendants 
who intentionally caused harm were either in prison or impecunious — usu-
ally both. But following overseas developments38, counsel started to claim 
them in New Zealand in cases of negligence. The first New Zealand case to 
award exemplary damages for negligent conduct was McLaren Transport 
Ltd. v. Somerville29. That was a case where a garage employee so negligently 
over-inflated a tractor tyre that it exploded injuring the plaintiff. He suffered 
serious physical injuries and so came under the definition of personal injury 
in the Act. He also had cover as the personal injury was caused by an 
accident. 
However he also sued for exemplary/punitive damages as well. In the 
High Court Tipping J. upheld the lower court award of $15,000 exemplary 
damages for negligent conduct. The test used by Tipping J. was a simple 
one: 
Exemplary damages for negligence causing personal injury may be awarded if, but 
only if, the level of negligence is so high that it amounts to an outrageous and 
flagrant disregard for the plaintiff's safety, meriting condemnation and punish-
ment. 
The matter did not go on appeal to the Court of Appeal, no doubt 
because the amount awarded was so low. 
However the Court of Appeal in another case which recently came 
before it, Ellison v. L40, would not commit itself to a decision that exemplary 
damages could be awarded for negligence. In that case Mrs. Ellison brought 
a claim for $250,000 exemplary damages against her dentist. He had ex-
tracted a tooth but negligently left some packing in the wound. This caused 
her some problems with infections until it was removed some nine months 
later. The Court of Appeal said : 
We are prepared to accept for the sake of argument, though leaving the matter to 
be decided on another occasion, that in some cases of negligence exemplary 
damages may be awarded. But because negligence is an unintentional tort those 
cases are likely to be rare indeed. Exemplary damages are awarded to punish a 
defendant for high handed disregard of the rights of a plaintiff or for acting in bad 
faith or for abusing a public position or behaving in some other outrageous manner 
which infringes the rights of the defendant. Negligence simpliciter will never 
suffice. 
38. Coloca v. BP Australia Ltd., [1992] 2 VR 441 ; Robitaille v. Vancouver Hockey Club 
Ltd., (1981) 125 DLR (3d) 228. 
39. [1996] 3 NZLR 424, (1996) 1 BACR 262. 
40. CA 287/96, 19 November 1997. 
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In New Zealand therefore it is now clear that there will be no exemplary 
damages for ordinary negligence and this may cause a reduction in the rising 
number of claims. 
2.2.2 Level Of Awards 
The negative attitude of the Court of Appeal to this upsurge in exem-
plary damages claims is no doubt a result of the high amounts (by New 
Zealand standards) being claimed and the perception that the amounts 
sought were really being sought as extra compensation. 
The Court of Appeal had warned of this in Donselaar v. Donselaar41 : 
The Courts will have to keep a tight rein on actions, with a view to countering any 
temptation, conscious or unconscious, to give exemplary damages merely because 
the statutory benefits may be felt to be inadequate. Immoderate amounts will have 
to be discouraged. 
Until recently even in cases of intentional torts the amounts awarded 
were quite low42. However in G v. G43 Cartwright J. awarded the sum of 
$85,000 in a case of serious domestic violence. The Judge contrasted the 
amounts awarded in personal injury claims with defamation awards of 
$180,000 to $400,000 and observed that there was little justification for such 
a contrast between large amounts ordered for harm to a reputation and the 
more modest amounts for the serious physical, emotional and sometimes 
psychiatric consequences of violence. 
However the increasing levels in the amounts being claimed coupled 
with an actual award of $85,000 in G v. G prompted the Court of Appeal in 
Ellison v. L to say : 
We desire to make an observation about the level of damages claimed. Mrs Ellison 
has sought leave to bring a claim for $250,000. Even if the conduct of the respondent 
had been outrageous and deserved to be marked by an award of exemplary 
damages, a claim of this size would be quite unrealistic. As far as we are aware, 
Judges in this country have restricted such awards to a mere fraction of the sum 
claimed here (for example, in McLaren Transport where apparently gross negli-
gence in the inflating of a tyre cause serious injury $15,000 was awarded). They 
have been right to do so. The marking out and punishment of outrageous behaviour 
can be adequately achieved by a relatively modest penalty. It is to be remembered 
that such awards are not intended as compensation. 
41. [1982] 1 NZLR 97. 
42. A. v. M., [1991] 3 NZLR 228 : $20,000 awarded for marital rape ; AB. v. CD. (High Court, 
Timaru, CP 53/89, Fraser J., 1 March 1992), $20,000 awarded for sexual abuse by father ; 
H. v. /?., [1996] 1 NZLR 299, $20,000 for sexual abuse ; B. v. R. (High Court, Auckland, 
M 1957/93, Morris J., 15 February 1996), $225,000 claimed, $35,000 awarded for sexual 
violation and abuse by uncle (now deceased).Value of estate worth $110,000. 
43. (1996) 1 BACR 286, [1997] NZFLR 49 : $200,000 claimed. 
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Legal advisers should be careful not to be associated with claims for amounts of 
damages which on any objective view are unattainable and give the appearance of 
being brought in terrorem44. 
Thus it appears clear that the amounts sought in exemplary damages 
claims particularly in negligence cases will be so limited from now on that it 
will probably not be worthwhile bringing the action. 
2.2.3 Prior Criminal Conviction 
Furthermore there has been another restriction on exemplary damages 
claims by the Court of Appeal in another recent decision Daniels v. 
Thompson45. In that case the Court of Appeal, on the grounds of public 
policy, barred exemplary damages in a number of sexual abuse claims where 
there has been a prior criminal conviction on the same matter. 
This will have a major impact on exemplary damages claims for sexual 
abuse and employment injuries. It may lead to the situation where victims 
of crime refuse to cooperate with the authorities in a prosecution so that 
they preserve their right to bring an exemplary damages claim. In G v. G it 
is interesting to note that in a case of serious domestic violence the plaintiff 
decided to sue for damages rather than prosecute. 
However in claims for injuries arising from motor accidents involving 
drunk drivers the offender is invariably prosecuted and punished without 
the need for any victim to appear. Thus there may be no choice of prosecu-
tion or litigation by such victims. 
2.2.4 Fatal Claims 
If the above restrictions were not enough, no exemplary damages are 
available where the injured person is killed by the tortfeasor. The Court of 
Appeal in Re Chase46 confirmed that section 3 (2) Law Reform Act 1936 
excludes exemplary damages claims from the claims that survive the death 
of the victim. 
2.2.5 Limitation Act 1950 
Another restriction on damages claims for personal injury in New 
Zealand is the short limitation period of two years in which to sue. How-
ever the Court of Appeal has recently developed the law in G D Searle & 
44. CA 287/96, 19 November 1997. 
45. CA 86/96, 12 February 1998. 
46. [1989] 1 NZLR 325. 
386 Les Cahiers de Droit (1998) 39 C. de D. 371 
Co. v. G47 so that time only runs from when bodily injury is discovered or 
reasonably ought to have been discovered. 
2.3 Lump Sums For Pain and Suffering Abolished 
The two previous ACC Acts (the Accident Compensation Acts of 1972 
and 1982) had lump sums available for pain, suffering and loss of amenities 
(up to NZ $10,000 under the 1982 Act) and for disability (up to NZ $17,000 
under the 1982 Act) based on a percentage disability figure. For non earners 
such as sexual abuse victims the lump sums were often the only significant 
compensation they received. The 1992 Act abolished these lump sums and 
replaced them with what is termed an independence allowance of NZ $40 
per week for a 100 % disability48. This sum was widely perceived as inade-
quate and also fuelled the rise in litigation. 
2.4 Upsurge in Litigation 
Thus the exclusion of mental trauma from the Act, the changing view 
of exemplary damages for negligence an the abolition of lump sums all 
contributed to the upsurge in litigation and brought lawyers back into the 
compensation process. While the Court of Appeal may have now curtailed 
the claims for exemplary damages for negligence the claims for mental 
trauma look set to escalate in an effort to obtain more compensation than 
that available under the Act. 
This leads on to the compensation available under the Act. While the 
increase in litigation has been fuelled by the abolition of lump sums the 
compensation and assistance available under the Act particularly for se-
riously injured earners can still be significant. 
3. Benefits 
The benefits available under the present Act are : 
1) 80 % of weekly earnings up to a maximum of NZ $1,179 per week49 ; 
2) An independence allowance up to NZ $60 per week based on a per-
centage disability figure50 ; 
47. [1996] 2 NZLR 129. 
48. Section 54 — since increased to $60 per week for a 100% disability. 
49. Sections 38 and 39. This is calculated on the gross earnings lost by the employee and 
income tax is payable on the weekly compensation. 
50. Sections 54 and 54A and Regulations. 
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3) Medical treatment51 ; 
4) Vocational and Social Rehabilitation assistance including the provision 
of attendant care up to 24 hours per day, home help, child care, aids and 
appliances, alterations to homes and motor vehicles, etc.52 ; 
5) In fatal claims there are : 
5.1) Funeral grant of NZ $3,000" ; 
5.2) Survivors grant to spouse—NZ $4,00054 ; 
5.3) Survivors grant to child under 18 — NZ $2,00055 ; 
5.4) Weekly compensation to spouse at 60 % of deceased's compen-
sation56 ; 
5.5) Weekly compensation to child under 18 at 20% of deceased's 
compensation57 ; 
6) Property Damage: Unlike the 1982 Act there is no compensation for 
property damage even for clothing or other personal items such as 
dentures or spectacles58 damaged in the accident. This is left to normal 
voluntary insurance arrangements and civil actions for damages. 
4. Funding 
4.1 Income Sources 
The ACC is financed from five income sources59 : 
51. Section 27 and Regulations. 
52. Sections 18-26A and over 30 different sets of regulations govern the provision of these 
matters and medical treatment. See the Regulations Section in See J. MILLER and 
D. RENNIE, op. cit., note 22. The Regulations are noted for their rigidity and the lack of 
discretion available to the ACC. In an effort to resolve this after many complaints from 
the public and the District Court who had to deal with the hard cases an amending 
section to the Act was passed (section 26A) in 1996. This gives a discretion to the ACC 
to exceed the regulations in the provison of assistance for social rehabilitation. 
53. Section 55. 
54. Section 56. 
55. Ibid., $2,000 is also payable to any other dependents of the deceased. 
56. Section 58. This is payable for up to 5 years or longer if the spouse has the care of a 
child under 18 or any other dependent of the deceased. 
57. Section 59. This extends to 21 years if the child is studying. Section 60 also provides a 
similar percentage of 20 % for other dependants of the deceased. No more that 100 % of 
the deceased's compensation is payable. 
58. Section 4. Definition of personal injury does not include these items and there is no other 
section in the Act or regulation to allow them in. 
59. Part VII of the Act, sections 100-134. 
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1. Employers (including the self employed) 
They pay a premium based on total payroll. The amount paid depends 
on the type of work and the injury record. This brought in NZ $1232.5 
million dollars in the year ending 1997. 
2. Earners 
People in the workforce pay a premium of 70 cents for every $100 
earned. This is collected as paye tax. It covers them for non work injuries 
apart from motor vehicle injuries. It brought in NZ $288 million dollars in 
the year ending 1997. 
3. Motor vehicle owners and drivers 
The premium is included in the annual registration fee (NZ $90 for a 
private car) and an excise duty of 2 cents per litre on petrol sales. These two 
brought in NZ $249.4 million dollars in the year ending 1997 (NZ $192.2 
million from premiums, N Z $57.2 million from petrol sales). 
4. Government Payment 
An annual payment to cover non earners. 
5. Investment earnings 
F r o m the respective account reserves. 
4.2 Accounts 
Injury costs are assigned to one of six accounts : 
1. The Employess ' AAcount 
This meets the cost of all work related injuries (apart from motor 
vehicle injuries)60. It also meets the cost of non work injuries before 1992. It 
is funded from employers premiums. 
60. The shifting of the costs of motor vehicle injuries out of the Employers and Earners 
account is really the only reason for considering whether an injury has been caused by 
a vehicle. The definition of a motor vehicle injury in section 3 is : 
a) Any injury occurring as a consequence of the movement of a motor vehicle or 
b) Any injury occurring as a consequence of a motor vehicle that is stationary being 
struck by another motor vehicle or other means of conveyance—but excludes an injury 
suffered in the course of loading, unloading, servicing, repair, or off-road use of a motor 
vehicle and any use of a motor vehicle other than as a means of conveyance. « Off-road 
use » does not include use of a motor vehicle that is off road as a direct result of its 
being out of control or its having been involved in an accident. 
Of the 6388 new motor vehicle claims in 1997, 379 were work related and cost $1,872 
million. There was also 1016 ongoing work claims at a cost of $16,603,000 : ACC Injury 
Statisiics, 1997, p. 46. 
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2. The Earners Account 
This meets the costs of people in the workforce who are injured outside 
of the workplace — e.g. at home or in sport. It does not include motor 
vehicle injuries61. It is funded from the earners premiums. 
3. The Non Earners Account 
This covers the cost of injuries to persons not in the workforce. It is 
funded by the Government from taxation. 
4. The Motor Vehicle Account 
This meets the cost of all injuries from motor vehicles62. It is funded 
from motor vehicle premiums and a petrol levy. 
5. The Subsequent Work Injury Account 
This meets the costs of work related claims that involve a recurrence 
of an injury received in a previous employment. It is funded from the above 
four accounts. 
6. The Medical Misadventure Account 
This meets the costs of injuries that result from medical misadventure 
by medical practitioners. It is funded from the earners and non earners 
accounts. 
4.3 Motor Vehicle Fund 
Reserves 1996 NZ $286,842,000 
Income 1997 NZ $305,218,00063 
Expenditure 1997 NZ $289,443,000 
Surplus 1997 NZ$15,775,000 
Backdated care claims NZ $82,996,000 
Deficit 1997 NZ$67,221,000 
Surplus carried forward NZ $219,621,000 
At 1 July 1996 the fund held reserves of NZ $286,842,000. Total income 
into the fund was NZ $305,218,000. This included premium income from 
registration, the petrol levy and investment income. Total expenditure on 
claims was NZ $289,443,000 leaving a surplus of NZ $15,775,000. 
61. Ibid. 
62. Ibid. 
63. The $305,218 million includes $192,198,000 from motor vehicle registration. There are 
approximately 2,4 million registered vehicles in NZ. A further $57,160,000 came from 
the petrol premium levy. The remainder is sundry and investment income : ACC Annual 
Report, 1997, p. 63. 
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However from this amount the sum of NZ $82,996,000 was set aside to 
pay for backdated attendant care claims64. This left a deficit of NZ $67,221,000 
which when taken away from the opening surplus reserves figure of 
NZ $286,842,000 left a surplus of NZ $219,621,000 at 30 June 1997. 
The funding of the motor vehicle part of the scheme is not a problem as 
it is always in surplus. It is not controversial. The main problems with the 
funding of ACC scheme has come from the employers' concerns over the 
funding of the Employers Account. Despite the fact that their ACC pre-
miums are often lower than the insurance premiums comparable employers 
pay overseas for workers compensation and employers liability insurance 
they have constantly lobbied for changes favourable to them in premium 
rates and ACC compensation. They have generally succeeded with their 
lobbying—hence the significant changes in the 1992 Act. 
4.4 Motor Vehicle Account Claims 
For the year ending 1997 there were 6388 new claims and 14,685 
ongoing claims made up as follows : 
Type New Claims Ongoing Claims Cost 
Claims Cost Claims Ongoing 
($000) New ($000) 
Cycling 249 474 537 6,560 
Bus 49 100 101 820 
Car 3,392 11,693 9,045 101,165 
Motorcycle 1,081 3,786 2,931 34,555 
Other vehicle 62 326 111 1,557 
Truck 202 982 534 7,375 
Not defined 972 1,858 229 1,016 
Other 39 109 48 744 
Pedestrian 342 1,148 1,149 11,956 
T O T A L 6,388 20,476 14,685 165,748 
64. The backdated attendant care claims which amount to NZ $216,355 million dollars over 
the various accounts arose from a. pro bono case {Campbell & Ors v. ACC, High Court, 
Wellington, AP 200/95, Heron and Ellis JJ., 4 April 1996). The writer was counsel for 
5 families whose children (4) or sibling (1) had been severely injured in traffic accidents. 
The injured claimants required 24 hour a day care but the ACC had only paid lesser 
amounts leaving the families (usually the female members) to cope with the shortfall. 
As a result of the decision the ACC have had to review and pay all such claims. Hence 
the sum set out in the accounts. 
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5. Compensating Criminals 
The only controversial aspect about motor vehicle compensation is the 
periodic public concern about compensation for the injured criminal driver 
specifically the drunk driver. This is governed as part of the general scheme 
by sections 81 to 84 of the Act. Section 81 denies all benefits65 even to 
dependants for any personal injury suffered as a result of wilfully self 
inflicted injuries or death by suicide. There does not appear to have been 
any cases on this section in relation to motor vehicle injuries or death 
presumably because it would be too difficult to prove in the absence of a 
suicide note that an injury or death in a motor vehicle crash was self 
inflicted. 
Section 82 denies all benefits to a dependant who murders the de-
ceased. This again does not appear to have arisen in the context of a motor 
vehicle death. 
Section 83 is more relevant as that denies any benefits under the Act 
while a person is an inmate in a prison. Thus an injured drunk driver who is 
imprisoned does not receive any benefits for that period. 
Before release from prison the provisions of section 84 will be invoked. 
That section provides as follows : 
S84 Denial of compensation where criminal act involved—(1) Where any person 
suffers personal injury in the course of committing any offence for which the 
person is convicted and is sentenced to imprisonment and the Corporation is aware 
of that sentence, the Corporation shall make an application to the District Court for 
a determination as to whether any treatment, service, rehabilitation, related trans-
port, compensation, grant or allowance should be payable on the person's release 
from such a penal institution within the meaning of the Penal Institutions Act 1954, 
or whether such payment shall not be made on the grounds that receipt of such 
payment would be repugnant to justice66. 
The key phrase in section 84 is repugnant to justice. That phrase was 
also used in a similar section — section 92 of the 1982 Act and was con-
sidered by the Court of Appeal in two cases under that Act : ACC v. Curtis 
and ACC v. McKee61. In Curtis the seriously injured claimant had been 
sentenced to imprisonment for traffic offences involving the death of three 
passengers in a car she was driving after consuming alcohol and drugs. In 
McKee the injured claimant was imprisoned for dangerous driving causing 
65. There is an exception where the injury or death is the result of mental injury or mental 
trauma from a sex crime : section 81 (2). 
66. The Corporation has to continue payment in full on release until a determination is made 
by the Court : section 84 (2). 
67. [1994] 2 NZLR 519; [1994] NZAR 289. 
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death when a motorcycle he was riding collided with a van at an intersection 
killing a passenger in a van. 
5.1 Principles Under 1982 Act 
The Court of Appeal decision in the two cases under the 1982 Act set 
out certain guideline principles for such cases. The question is whether they 
still apply to the 1992 Act. The principles to be considered under the 1982 
Act were : 
1 ) The dominant purpose of the Act is to provide comprehensive no fault 
cover for all, including those whose injuries were suffered in the course 
of criminal conduct attracting imprisonment. 
2) Section 92 of the 1982 Act overrides that general purpose where statu-
tory assistance would be repugnant to justice, i.e. where the demands 
of retribution, denunciation, deterrence, and reparation outweigh the 
general purposes of the statute. 
3) Considerations relevant to the exercise of the section 92 discretion 
include : the gravity of the crime, the extent of other penalties suffered, 
the claimant's personal circumstances, the nature of the proposed 
statutory assistance, the strength of the need and the claimant's own 
resources to meet it. 
4) Once the considerations relevant to the particular case have been 
identified their relative weight must be assessed. The nature and se-
riousness of the crime compared with the urgency of the need for 
statutory assistance will be of particular importance. 
5) Once identified and evaluated the question will be whether the relevant 
considerations in their totality would make statutory assistance repug-
nant to justice, noting that the threshold required before refusing or 
reducing benefits is a high one. 
6) A decision under section 92 may be to allow any given item of statutory 
assistance in full, to refuse it completely or to allow it in part only. The 
decision may be made globally with respect to a series of items or 
discreetly with respect to each. 
In both cases the decision was for a 50 % reduction in the lump sums 
then available under the 1982 Act. 
5.2 1992 Act 
The question under section 84 of the 1992 Act is whether the same 
principles apply. What is different about the 1992 Act is that principle 1) no 
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longer applies as the Act no longer provides comprehensive no fault cover 
for all. Those suffering mental trauma are excluded as are many medical 
injuries68. Hence compensating the injured drunk driver is even more likely 
to be repugnant to justice than beforehand. If the family of someone killed 
by a drunk driver would not come within the Act for any mental trauma they 
suffer why should the drunken driver be compensated ? There has also been 
a hardening of attitude in respect of drink driving and a call for tougher 
penalties in recent years. 
On the other hand unlike the 1982 Act earners under the 1992 Act now 
pay their own premiums to the Earners Fund. Thus a drunken driver who is 
an earner and therefore a premium payer has more of a claim to compensa-
tion than hitherto when he paid nothing. Furthermore the words « repugnant 
to justice » mean more than « unjust or inequitable » — it is a very high 
standard to reach — analogous to « the existence of extraordinary circum-
stance» as the Court of Appeal defined similar words in a matrimonial 
property case69. 
5.3 1992 Act Cases 
There have been two cases in the District Court under section 84 of the 
1992 Act. In ARCI v. Findlay10 the 21 year old claimant was sentenced to 
three and a half years imprisonment for manslaughter and six months 
imprisonment on each of three charges of causing injury by an unlawful act. 
The charges arose from a driving incident which had also left the claimant a 
paraplegic. The Judge simply applied the 1982 Act principles in Curtis and 
McKee and declined payment of the independence allowance and reduced 
the weekly compensation to 60 % rather than the entitled 80 %. 
In ARCI v. MitcheP1 the claimant suffered head injuries in a fatal 
accident caused by his drunken reckless driving. He was sentenced to nine 
years imprisonment for manslaughter. As he was not an earner prior to the 
accident, there was no entitlement to weekly compensation. However the 
decision was made not to pay the independence allowance either or provide 
any form of social rehabilitation. Only medical treatment and medical 
services for his head injury was allowed. 
It would thus appear that the Curtis and McKee principles under the 
1982 Act are being applied but with a harsher result in that as there are no 
68. The definition of medical misadventure in section 5 of the Act excludes an adverse 
consequence of treatment if it not rare (1 % risk or less) and not severe. 
69. Martin v. Martin, [1979] 1 NZLR 97. 
70. District Court, Christchurch, MA 227/97 Doherty J., 28 October 1997. 
71. District Court, Christchurch, NP 1536/97 Noble J., 9 December 1997. 
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lump sums anymore and the independence allowance is seen as a meagre 
replacement the weekly compensation is also being reduced. 
Conclusion 
The motor vehicle scheme is an integral part of the overall Accident 
Compensation system. It has operated successfully with no real problems. 
The recent upsurge in exemplary damages and mental trauma claims and the 
re-entry of lawyers into the compensation process have also not involved 
motor vehicle claims as much as other areas. 
However now that lawyers have returned they will probably remain 
and look for ways damages claims can still be brought. There are indications 
that the Government is considering opening up the ACC to competition and 
the motor vehicle scheme with its healthy surplus and lack of problems 
would be an attractive segment for insurance companies. It may be that we 
are in the process of returning to a « fragmented and capricious » system. 
